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Non-trivial calculi of inductive inference are incomplete. This 
result is demonstrated formally elsewhere (Norton, manuscript). 
Here the significance and background to the result is described. 
This note explains what is meant by incompleteness, why it is 
desirable, if only it could be secured, and it gives some indication 
of the arguments needed to establish its failure. The discussion will 
be informal, using illustrative examples rather than general results. 
Technical details and general proofs are presented in Norton 
(manuscript). 
Introduction	  
 The first part of this paper describes what it would be for a calculus of inductive 
inference to be complete, using the illustration of the Bayesian analysis of simplicity; and it 
explains why the completeness is desirable, if only it could be secured. In brief, completeness is 
achieved when computations in the calculus are carried out in a domain sufficiently large so that 
the computations do not need to call upon inductive content that is external to the domain. 
                                                
1 I am grateful for helpful discussion especially to Wayne Myrvold and to Yann Benétreau-
Dupin and the Fellows of the Center for Philosophy of Science, Spring Term, 2015, who urged 
me to write this introductory account. 
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Completeness would allow us to characterize inductive inference merely as inference that 
conforms to the calculus at issue. This characterization would provide a clear and simple solution 
to the enduring foundational problems of inductive inference. All such problems would be 
reduced to questions answerable by computation in the calculus. 
 This attractive solution to the foundational problems fails. Non-trivial calculi of inductive 
inference are incomplete. These incomplete calculi include many more than just the probability 
calculus.  This incompleteness explains why particular calculi of inductive inference are beset by 
lingering difficulties. The Bayesian system is perpetually struggling to overcome the problem of 
the priors. Augmented calculi are repeatedly proposed to solve problems in older calculi, while 
none manages without its own, new problems. All these problems arise because we are really 
trying to formulate a complete calculus of inductive inference. That they must linger unsolved 
does not derive from a failure of our imagination to hit upon just the right solution. It is a 
necessity derived from incompleteness. 
 The second part of this paper will provide a simplified guide to the full proof of this 
failure, given elsewhere. Here is a terse summary of the main result that will be introduced and 
explained in greater detail in this paper. The incompleteness arises from the combination of two 
desirable properties of calculi of inductive inference. 
 The first property is an expression of completeness: we can find a sufficiently large set of 
propositions in which the inductive strengths of support are fixed by relations in the set, without 
the need to import any inductive content from outside it. Since the only other inferential 
resources within the set are the deductive relations among the propositions, this amounts to 
requiring that the inductive strengths of support are fixed by the deductive relations among the 
propositions in the set. This requirement is unremarkable. The Kolmogorov axioms of 
probability theory are a routine part of such a specification. These axioms adapt the probabilities 
to the deductive structure. They need only a small supplement to fix the probabilities uniquely. 
 The second property involves disjunctive refinements of propositions. Through them we 
replace a proposition 
“Person X is in Boston.” 
by a disjunction of its disjunctive parts: 
“Person X is in Boston-location-1 or Person X is in Boston-location-2 or 
… or Person X is in Boston-location-r.” 
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Such disjunctive refinement increases the expressive power of the set of propositions and leads 
to adjustments of the inductive strengths of support. The requirement of asymptotic stability 
asserts that continuing disjunctive refinement eventually provides such diminished further power 
that the inductive strengths of support among some fixed set of propositions stabilize to limiting 
values. Further refinement eventually becomes inert, inductive hair-splitting. 
 The failure of the completeness resides in the impossibility of sustaining both properties.2 
In briefest terms, the deductive closure of any set of propositions is highly symmetric. Each of 
the non-contradictory, logically strongest propositions—the “atoms”—enter into the same 
deductive relations. As a result, a deductively definable logic of induction must treat them alike. 
Each new disjunctive refinement will alter the atoms and, as a result, the inductive strengths 
throughout the set. It turns out that a deductively definable logic of induction will continue to 
respond without stabilization to suitably crafted, continuing disjunctive refinements, unless it is a 
trivial logic that assigns the same limiting inductive strengths everywhere. 
 One might be tempted by an obvious rejoinder: if continuing refinement causes 
continuing problems, stop refining! Declare one specific refinement as preferred; or declare that 
its propositions comprise a preferred language. That resolves the problem. But the decision of 
when to stop or which is the preferred language must be made on external, inductive grounds. It 
privileges certain propositions and thus amounts to the introduction of external inductive content, 
in violation of the requirement of completeness. 
 The third part of this paper takes stock and reviews possible responses. 
PART	  I.	  The	  Ideal	  of	  Completeness	  
The	  Many	  Problems	  of	  Induction	  
 Philosophical accounts of inductive inference are not in good shape. Simple enumerative 
induction fails more than it succeeds. It is almost never the case that, when some As are B, it also 
happens that all As are B. Other approaches embroil us in larger philosophical puzzles with little 
                                                
2 The proof strategy is an extension of the familiar problems introduced by the principle of 
indifference probabilistic logic. See Norton (2008) for discussion. 
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hope of resolution. Infer to the best explanation, we are told. But we are offered no precise 
characterization of just what is a good explanation or why explaining, whatever it is, has such 
evidential powers. Ad hoc hypotheses do not deserve evidential support, we are told.  But we are 
left to wonder why an hypothesis is punished for being tailored to fit the evidence. Is not that sort 
of fit just what we seek? Finally, to mention an example that will return below, evidence favors 
simpler hypotheses, we are told. But we have no serviceable characterization of what makes an 
hypothesis simpler or why such hypotheses should be favored. 
 These are just the beginnings of the difficulties. Over the centuries, inductive inference has 
attracted a fulsome collection of general problems that threaten the very cogency of this form of 
inference. We have Hume’s problem, Hempel’s raven, Goodman’s grue and Quine’s 
underdetermination. The difficulties are so enduring that mere mention of induction calls 
philosophical pain to mind. 
Calculating	  Mechanically	  
 The tenacity of these problems stands in striking contrast with deductive inference. While 
there are always complications at the fringes, the core is stable to the point of tedium. Modus 
ponens is a valid argument. Affirming the consequent is a fallacy. These facts of logic leave no 
room for doubt or debate. We separate the valid from the invalid deductive inferences merely by 
checking whether the argument form used is one of the approved argument forms in a logic 
textbook. The exercise is reminiscent of making travel plans by checking a train timetable. 
 In this regard, deductive logic is more like arithmetic than inductive inference. It is an 
uncontested, particular fact of arithmetic that 7,919 is the thousandth prime number; and it is 
merely a matter of tedious computation using standard algorithms to check it. More general facts 
have a similar security. That there are infinitely many prime numbers is proved by a theorem 
known since the time of Euclid. Anyone who doubts the infinity of the primes can consult the 
proof and, by working through its steps, receive all the assurance a reasonable person could 
require. 
A	  Calculus	  for	  Inductive	  Inference?	  
 Might the problems of inductive inference be resolvable in a similar way? Might the 
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puzzles of induction be converted into queries that can be put to and answered by mechanical 
computation in some suitable calculus? The presently most popular approach to inductive 
inference, the Bayesian approach, holds out the promise of such a solution. The approach is 
based on the supposition that inductive support or warranted belief is captured by the 
mathematical calculus of probabilities. Much of Bayesian analysis is the tedious working of 
proofs in the calculus. The strength of inductive support provided by some item of evidence for 
some hypothesis is computed numerically as a conditional probability. General facts about 
inductive inference are established as theorems of the probability calculus, much as Euclid 
proved the infinity of the primes. In each case, we have the comforting assurance that, one way 
or another, a computation will provide a precise answer to our question. 
A	  Bayesian	  Analysis	  of	  Simplicity	  
 Here is an illustration of such a computation. A familiar principle is that evidence favors a 
simpler hypothesis. For example, when we fit a curve to data, we may find a good enough fit 
from the hypothesis of a straight line and a slightly better fit from a parabola. We are routinely 
willing to forgo a slightly better fit by a parabola for the lesser fit of straight line, because we 
prefer to use the simpler hypothesis. 
 This preference for the simpler can be vindicated in Bayesian analysis. The key to it is that 
there are fewer of the simpler hypotheses. A straight line—“y=ax+b”—is fixed by just two 
adjustable parameters, a and b. A parabola—“y=ax2+bx+c”—is fixed by three parameters, a, b 
and c. Hence there are many more of the more complicated hypotheses. The straight line 
hypotheses form a two dimensional space. The parabolic hypotheses form a three dimensional 
space. 
 A still simpler example uses this fact and will suffice to get to the key point. Imagine that 
we have to choose between a simple hypothesis and a more complicated one. Let us say that the 
simple hypotheses is drawn from a ten-membered set {Hsim1, Hsim2, … , Hsim10} of hypotheses 
of comparable simplicity. The complicated hypothesis is drawn from a much larger, one-
hundred-membered set {Hcom1, Hcom2, … , Hcom100} of hypotheses of comparable 
complication. We shall assign equal prior probability to each set: 
P({Hsim1, Hsim2, … , Hsim10}) = P({Hcom1, Hcom2, … , Hcom100})                    (1) 
 6 
where conditionalization on a background Ω is supposed but not represented. We then spread the 
probability uniformly within each set. Since the second set has ten times as many members as the 
first, the prior probability of any of individual simple hypothesis Hsim i is ten times as great as 
the prior probability of any of the complicated hypotheses Hcom k. 
€ 
P(Hsim  i )
P(Hcom  k )
=10                                                                      (2) 
Let us say that the two hypotheses Hsim i and Hcom k fit roughly equally well with the evidence. 
That is, the supposition of each makes the evidence E roughly equally probable: 
P(E|Hsim i) ≈ P(E|Hcom k) 
so that the ratio of likelihoods P(E|Hsim i) / P(E|Hcom k) ≈ 1. The relative strength of support 
from the evidence and background together for the hypotheses is expressed by the ratio of 
posterior probabilities P(Hsim i|E) / P(Hcom k|E). It can be calculated with the ratio form of 
Bayes’ theorem: 
€ 
P(Hsim  i | E)
P(Hcom  k | E)
=
P(E | Hsim  i )
P(E | Hcom  k )
⋅
P(Hsim  i )
P(Hcom  k )
 
Since the likelihood ratio is approximately one, the ratio of the priors (2) is the deciding factor 
that gives a large boost to the probability of the simpler hypotheses: 
€ 
P(Hsim  i | E)
P(Hcom  k | E)
≈
P(Hsim  i )
P(Hcom  k )
=10                                                    (3) 
In brief, since there are fewer simpler hypotheses, a natural spreading of prior probabilities (1) 
can assign higher prior probability to the simpler hypotheses. When the evidence is equivocal in 
choosing among the hypothesis, this higher prior probability gives the simpler hypothesis the 
decisive advantage. 
 While this captures the essentials of the Bayesian analysis, more realistic cases are messier. 
There are almost always infinitely many hypotheses grouped into one complexity class and then, 
in addition, infinitely many such classes. Simply counting hypotheses no longer works. More 
sophisticated analyses are needed, while the essentials remain the same. Jeffreys (1961, p. 47) 
measures the complexity of classes of curves by the sum of the order, the degree and the absolute 
values of the coefficients of a suitably reduced differential equation that governs the curves. 
Solomonoff (1964) measures complexity as algorithmic complexity; that is, the measure is the 
size of the smallest universal Turing machine program needed to generate the hypothesis. They 
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both then exponentially penalize the prior probability of each complexity class so that the 
probabilities can sum to unity. 
External	  Inductive	  Content	  
 In many examples like this, Bayesian analysis has been able to reduce an inductive puzzle 
to a computation in the probability calculus. In each case, however, it turns out that the analysis 
is not self-contained. Each requires supplement by external inductive content. That is, the 
computation depends on direct or indirect specification of inductive strengths of support by 
considerations external to the computation. 
 Take the case of the analysis of simplicity above. We assigned equal probability to the two 
complexity classes in (1) and then spread the assigned probability uniformly within each class. 
The outcome was that each of the simpler hypotheses was assigned a greater prior probability; 
and this was key to the whole analysis. Yet nothing within the probabilistic computation forced 
this assignment. We could merely have assigned the same prior probability to each hypothesis 
individually 
P(Hsim1) = P(Hsim2) = … = P(Hsim10}) 
= P(Hcom1) = P(Hcom2) =  … =P(Hcom100)                              (1’) 
This alternative assignment would have defeated the analysis. For then, instead of (2), we would 
have had: 
€ 
P(Hsim  i )
P(Hcom  k )
=1                                                                     (2’) 
and the simpler hypothesis would have received no probabilistic boost: 
€ 
P(Hsim  i | E)
P(Hcom  k | E)
≈
P(Hsim  i )
P(Hcom  k )
=1                                                       (3’) 
 The point is not that the assignment of (1) is unjustifiable. One could certainly conceive 
circumstances in which we would be warranted in assigning a higher prior probability to a 
simpler hypothesis. And we could conceive others in which this might not be so. 
 The point is that the assignment of (1) is provided externally to the probabilistic 
computation that takes us from (1) to the main result (3). This means that the recovery of the 
result (3) by the computation is not inductively self-contained. Essential inductive content is 
provided from an external source. To preclude confusion, by “inductive content” I mean merely 
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the assignments of probability in (1) or (1’). 
The	  Ideal	  of	  Completeness	  
 A natural response to the presence of the external inductive content in the Bayesian 
analysis of simplicity is that we have set our boundaries too narrowly. That the simpler 
hypotheses ought to be assigned a higher prior probability is something that can in turn be 
learned inductively. In Jeffreys’ analysis of simplicity, we are to assume that nature favors 
curves drawn from the simpler of his complexity classes. In Solomonoff’s analysis, we are to 
assume that nature favors hypotheses that are algorithmically simpler. Neither of these are a 
priori truths. They are contingent facts about the world. Ascertaining their truth is a matter of 
further inductive investigation. If we extend the boundaries of our computation, we would hope 
to capture those considerations as well. 
 What if those considerations in turn depend upon further external inductive content? We 
would then extend our boundaries still further. Let us suppose that it is possible to extend the 
boundary of the computational domain so far that no external inductive content is needed. What  
would result is an account of all the relations of inductive support within the domain that is fully 
contained in a single, enormous computation in the probability calculus. 
 While such an enormous computation would surely outstrip any human powers of 
comprehension, its possibility in principle is of profound foundational importance. It would 
mean that the probability calculus is all we need for a full understanding of inductive inference 
within a suitably large domain. 
 All particular facts of inductive support within that domain would be expressible by 
particular probabilistic relations among its propositions. That the straight-line hypothesis is better 
supported by the evidence would be expressed by its greater probability; and so on for every 
other particular fact of inductive support.  
 The same would be true for general facts about inductive inference. Every general fact 
could, in principle, be captured by some general theorem within this huge computation. If, for 
example, simpler hypotheses are favored evidentially in this domain, that general fact would be 
captured by a theorem. It would assert that the prior probabilities of hypotheses in simpler 
classes must, in general, be higher, as in (1). All this, at both the level of the particular and the 
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general, could be known without drawing upon any inductive content from outside the domain. 
The analysis would be self-contained. 
Its	  Failure	  
 What is shown in Norton (manuscript) and will be reviewed below is that this ideal of 
completeness is unattainable. A very large class of possible calculi that likely includes any 
calculus one might realistically consider, proves unable to support this ideal of completeness. 
This failure is profound foundationally. It tells us something important about the nature of 
inductive inference itself: it cannot be fully characterized merely by a calculus. 
 To get a sense of this import, it is helpful to compare it with the familiar incompleteness of 
arithmetic. It was once quite reasonable to expect that all the truths of arithmetic could be 
captured by a few axioms. For example, Peano’s axioms lay down a few simple properties of 
natural numbers: 1 is a number; every number has a unique successor; and so on. We would hope 
that we could identify all of arithmetic with all the truths that can be deduced from these axioms. 
 Famously, Gödel demonstrated that no finite axiom system can capture all arithmetic truths 
in this way. The truths of arithmetic are something more than what can be deduced from any 
fixed, finite system of axioms. We may, of course, be able to derive very many important and 
interesting arithmetic truths from our favorite axiom system. However, no matter which finite 
axiom system we favor, there will always be arithmetic truths that are external to its theorems. 
 I hesitate to draw a comparison with Gödel’s result, for his result is profound and his 
methods extraordinarily ingenious. The corresponding methods for inductive calculi are simple 
and mechanical and the result rather banal. But the significance of the result for inductive logic is 
comparable. 
 We may have a favored calculus for inductive inference and be able to infer many 
important and useful results within it. We might then seek to characterize inductive inference 
merely as inference that conforms with some specific calculus, such as the probability calculus. 
The incompleteness tells us that characterization fails. There is always more to inductive support 
than can be captured by the calculus. Searching for theorems within a favored calculus can only 
ever return a partial understanding. Inductive inference cannot be reduced to inference that 
conforms with some favored calculus. 
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PART	  II.	  Demonstrating	  the	  Failure	  
Deductive	  Structure	  
 How is the incompleteness demonstrated? The first step is to fix the environment in 
which the inductive logic is applied. We take a fixed set of propositions 
{A1, A2, … , Am}. 
and our concern will be to determine the inductive relations prevailing among these propositions. 
This set is intended to be not just large, but very large. It might be all the hypotheses entertained 
in science, all the evidence statements that may support them and every other proposition that in 
some way mediates between them. That set—all the propositions we have entertained in 
science—will be large. But it will still be finite. For there have only been finitely many scientists 
and, given some finite limit of the length of sentences, only finitely many propositions 
expressible. 
 These propositions come with a deductive structure. That structure is just the set of all 
deductive entailment relations among the m propositions. It may turn out, for example, that 
A1235 deductively entails A441; or that A57 and A103 logically incompatible, so that their 
conjunction entails the contradiction ∅. The deductive structure is the totality of these deductive 
relations. 
 It will be essential for what follows to see that this structure is highly symmetric. That 
symmetry is harder to see if we consider merely the propositions A1, A2, … , Am by themselves. 
Rather we take the larger set of propositions generated by Boolean operations; that is, by taking 
all negations (“not” ~), disjunctions (“or” v) and conjunctions (“and” &) of the propositions. The 
set of sentences that results is infinite. However the set of logically distinct propositions is not. 
The set contains many logically equivalent sentences. The sentence A1, for example, is logically 
equivalent to all of ~~ A1, ~~~~ A1, A1v A1, A1& (A2v~ A2), etc. 
A	  Boolean	  Algebra	  of	  Propositions	  
 The deductive structure, with all these duplications eliminated, is best characterized by 
identifying its “atoms.” These are the logically strongest (non-contradictory) propositions. A 
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finite set of propositions can support only finitely many atoms. Take the simple case of two 
propositions in the set {A,B}, where we assume they are logically compatible and do not exhaust 
the space. Then there are four distinct atoms: 
a1 = A&B   a2 = A&~B   a3 = ~A&B   a4 = ~A&~B 
The proposition a1 is an atom since nothing (other than the contradiction ∅) entails it.  
 These four atoms generate a four-atom Boolean algebra of finitely many propositions, 
which has five distinct logical levels 
the universal proposition: Ω4 = a1 v a2 v a3 v a4 
three-atom disjunctions: a1 v a2 v a3,   a1 v a2 v a4,   a1 v a3 v a4,   a2 v a3 v a4 
two-atom disjunctions: a1 v a2,   a1 v a3,   a1 v a4,   a2 v a3,   a2 v a4,   a3 v a4 
atoms: a1, a2, a3, a4 
the contradiction: ∅ 
The original propositions A and B reside within this Boolean algebra as A = a1 v a2 and B = a1 v 
a3. Figure 1 is a picture of the algebra, showing the distinct levels. The arrows represent 
deductive entailment. 
Ø
Ω
a1
a1va2va3
a2va3
a1va2
a1va3
a1va3va4a1va2va4
a2va4
a1va4
a2va3va4
a3va4
a2 a3
a4
 
Figure 1. A Four-Atom Boolean Algebra 
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Symmetries	  of	  Deductive	  Structure	  
 A Boolean algebra is a highly symmetric structure. Informally speaking, each level is 
homogeneous. That is, the entire algebra “looks the same” from any proposition we pick in the 
level. For example, take the two-atom disjunction level of the four-atom algebra. Each 
disjunction in it is entailed by two atoms; and each disjunction in the two-atom layer in turn 
entails just two three-atom disjunctions. The only change, as we move around within one of the 
levels is the labeling of the atoms that appear in the deductive entailments. 
 When there are very many atoms in the algebra, the basic structure remains the same. 
There are now, however, many more levels: the one-atom level, the two-atom level, the three-
atom level, and so on for very many more levels. As before, each level in the algebra is 
homogenous. That is, the algebra looks the same, as far as deductive relations are concerned, 
from each proposition in the same level. 
 More formally, this symmetry is expressed as a labeling invariance. That is, the total 
deductive structure is unchanged if we permute the labels attached to the atoms. Take the four 
atoms 
a1, a2, a3, a4 
and permute their labels any way you please. You might just switch the first two, so that the 
atoms are now labeled 
a2, a1, a3, a4 
Or you might cyclically permute them to  
a2, a3, a4, a1 
In both cases, propagate the labeling change through the remainder of the algebra. For these 
permutations and for any others, the total deductive structure will remain unchanged. If a1 entails 
a1 v a2 entails a1 v a2 v a3 prior to the permutations of atomic labels, the same will be true for the 
relabeled propositions. 
 The symmetry is easier to see geometrically in a simpler figure that shows just a three-
atom algebra. Figure 2 shows the same three-atom algebra, differing only in the arbitrary 
labeling for the atoms. Labels a1 and a2 are switched on one side; and atom labels a1, a2 and a3 
are cyclically permuted on the other: 
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Ø
Ω
a1
a2va3a1va2
a1, a2
switch
a1, a2, a3
cycle
a1va3
a2
a3
Ø
Ω
a1
a2va3
a1va2a1va3
a2a3
Ø
Ω
a1
a2va3
a1va2 a1va3
a2 a3
 
Figure 2. Relabelings of a Three-Atom Algebra 
Deductively	  Definable	  Logics	  of	  Induction	  
 A calculus of inductive inference will here be built around the fundamental quantity 
“[A|B]”, which is the strength of the inductive support afforded proposition A by proposition B. 
The strength might be a conditional probability, which means that it conforms with the 
probability calculus. The strength need not be a probability. It may be a strength that conforms 
with one of many other calculi. 
 Other choices are possible for the basic quantity. We could instead use “[A|B,C]”, which 
could be interpreted as the strength of inductive support afforded proposition A by B with 
respect to background C. It will become clear that the arguments leading to incompleteness can 
be mounted in variant form for each of these choices. We will proceed with just [A|B] since it is 
all that is needed to see how the arguments run. 
 A calculus of inductive inference is a system of rules that enables the assignment by purely 
mechanical computation of all the strengths [Ai|Ak]  for propositions in the set {A1, A2, … , 
Am}. They key question is which resources these rules may use. If the domain in which the set 
resides is sufficiently large for completeness, then the rules may not use any inductive content 
from outside the domain. That is, it may not set any of the [Ai|Ak] by external considerations 
independent of the rules of the calculus. 
 This restriction then leaves as the sole resource the deductive relations among the 
propositions in the set {A1, A2, … , Am} and their deductive relations with the other 
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propositions in the larger algebra Ω in which it resides. A calculus that employs just this 
deductive structure in specifying its strength is “deductively definable.” 
Two	  Sample	  Logics	  	  
 At first it may seem that deductive definability is excessively restrictive. It is not. Rather it 
is the standard way of specifying a calculus of this type. As a general matter, the definitions of 
the strengths [Ai|Ak] may be supplied by explicit or implicit definitions. 
 The latter implicit definitions are more commonly used. The celebrated Kolmogorov  
axioms (1950) for the probability axioms provide implicit definitions solely in terms of the 
deductive structures among the propositions in the outcome space. These axioms, used to define 
an additive measure m on the algebra, assert: 
For any A, m(A)≥0. (4a) 
m(Ω) = 1 (4b) 
If A&B=∅, then m(AvB) = m(A) + m(B) (4c) 
This is an implicit definition of the additive measure m. It consists of three sentences in which 
the measure appears; and those sentences otherwise only mention the deductive structure of the 
algebra. For example, (4b) assigns unity to the universal proposition Ω, distinguished by the fact 
that it is deductively entailed by all the propositions in the algebra. The summation rule relates 
the measure of a disjunction to the measures of the disjuncts, in the special case in which the 
disjuncts are deductively incompatible. 
 The Kolmogorov axioms constrain the measure m, but do not definite it uniquely. In any 
given algebra, there will be infinitely many measures compatible with the axioms. We can assure 
uniqueness of m in some algebra by adding further conditions, such as: 
For all atoms, a1, a2, …, an, 
m(a1) = m(a2) = … = m(an) 
(5) 
Once again, this sentence mentions only deductive structure. The atoms a1, a2, …, an are the 
propositions in the algebra that are deductively entailed by no other propositions (other than the 
contradiction, ∅). 
 This uniquely defined additive measure can now be used to introduce the familiar inductive 
strength of support, a conditional probability. For all propositions A and B, where B is not ∅ 
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€ 
[A | B]P = P(A | B) =
m(A& B)
m(B)                                                        (6) 
In order to underscore that these results apply to many calculi, we can also define a different 
calculus—a “specific conditioning” logic—by replacing (6) by the following.3 For all 
propositions A and B, where neither A nor B is ∅ 
€ 
[A | B]SC = P(A | B) =
m(A& B)2
m(A)m(B)                                                        (7) 
We will see shortly in an example what motivates this logic. 
General	  Form	  of	  the	  Definitions	  
 The conditions (4), (5) and (6) implicitly define a probabilistic calculus of inductive 
inference. The conditions (4), (5) and (7) implicitly define a distinct “specific conditioning” 
calculus of inductive inference. What will matter in what follows is the general form of the 
definitions: 
General form of the implicit definition: 
Set of sentences that mention the strengths [Ai|Ak] and deductive relations 
among the members of the set {A1, A2, … , Am}  and the other 
propositions in the algebra. 
These two examples are just two of many possible deductively definable logics of induction. 
More are described in Norton (2010). 
 A simple and natural one derives from the basic notion of hypothetico-deductive 
confirmation. According to it, if hypothesis H deductively entails evidence E, then evidence E 
inductively supports H. This much provides for a single value “supports” for [H|E] via the 
explicit definition: 
If H deductively entails E, then [H|E] = supports. 
There is much scope to enhance the definition. We might replace the single value with increasing 
numerical values the closer that H is to E in terms of the levels of the Boolean algebra. If, for 
example, H = a1 v a2 from the level of two atom disjunctions and E = a1 v a2 v a3 v a4 from the 
                                                
3 For more details of the properties of a special conditioning logic, see Norton (2010, §11.2). 
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level of four atom disjunctions, then the strength of support might be defined as 2/4. Then the 
closer they are in levels, the stronger the support. This gives the augmented definition4 
If H from the level of m atom disjunctions 
deductively entails E from the level of n atom disjunctions, 
then [H|E] = m/n. 
This second example illustrates the general form of an explicit definition of inductive strengths: 
General form of the explicit definition: 
The strengths [Ai|Ak] are determined by a formula that mentions only the 
deductive relations among the members of the set {A1, A2, … , Am}  and 
the other propositions in the algebra. 
In the example, the formula is “m/n”, where the quantities n and m are related to atom counts and 
are thus recoverable from the deductive structure of the Boolean algebra. 
 This hypothetico-deductive model could be enhanced still further by rewarding hypotheses 
with stronger support if they are more explanatory or simpler. To do this requires that we have 
some way of identifying which hypotheses are more explanatory or which are simpler. If that can 
be done by adding further propositions to the algebra, then the definition of the inductive 
strengths can still meet the requirement that they draw only on resources within the domain. If 
that cannot be done and these judgments require resources outside the domain, then we have 
already established that these particular augmentations of the hypothetico-deductive scheme are 
not complete. 
The	  Quest	  for	  an	  Art	  Thief	  
 As an illustration, we will imagine an inductive problem presented to the police in their 
efforts to track down the location of a notorious art thief. They know, we shall say, that the art 
thief is in one of four cities: Boston “BOS”, New York “NY”, Philadelphia “PHL” or Pittsburgh 
“PIT.” That is we have 
Ω = BOS v NY v PHL v PIT 
These four propositions are the atoms of the algebra. Their evidence is that the thief is in an east 
                                                
4 This definition induces a product rule. If A entails B entails C, then [A|C] = [A|B]x[B|C].  
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coast, Atlantic port city “EC”: 
EC = BOS v NY v PHL 
We can then ask how much support EC provides to the various possibilities. We have from the 
Kolmogorov axioms (4) and condition (5) that 
m(BOS) = m(NY) = m(PHL) = m(PIT) = 1/4 
It follows from the definition (6) that the evidence EC gives the same support to the hypothesis 
BOS as it does to the disjunction BOS v PIT 
P(BOS | EC) = P(BOS v PIT | EC) = 1/3 
This is a familiar property of conditional probability. Since the proposition PIT contradicts the 
evidence EC, forming a disjunction with BOS does not alter the conditional probability. 
 While it is familiar, this is an oddity of probabilistic support. Unless we have honed our 
sense of evidential support on probabilistic notions, we would judge the support provided by EC 
for BOS to be weakened when we form a disjunction with a city PIT that contradicts the 
evidence. The evidence specifically supports BOS, not PIT. Within the probabilistic analysis, we 
can recover the fact that the PIT disjunct plays no role in the support accrued to BOS v PIT by 
noting that the probability is unchanged when we eliminate the PIT disjunct. We have to do the 
additional work of determining that the evidence points better to BOS rather than BOS v PIT. 
 The specific conditioning logic (7) is designed to remedy this defect. It does the work of 
discriminating between BOS and BOS v PIT by assigning a lower strength of support to BOS v 
PIT. That is, we have 
€ 
[BOS | EC]SC =
m(BOS& EC)2
m(BOS)m(EC) =
12
1⋅ 3 =
1
3  
whereas 
€ 
[BOS∨PIT | EC]SC =
m((BOS∨PIT )& EC)2
m(BOS∨PIT )m(EC) =
12
2 ⋅ 3 =
1
6  
so that 1/6 = [(BOS v PIT) | EC]SC < [BOS | EC]SC = 1/3. Perhaps in this case, the advantage of 
the specific conditioning logic is unclear. But that is only because we can “see through” the 
example and recognize the odd, disjunctive character of the hypothesis BOS v PIT. In more 
complicated cases, this might not be possible and we would benefit from the specific 
conditioning logic doing the work of recognizing the oddity for us.
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Symmetry	  Constraints	  on	  Deductively	  Definable	  Inductive	  Logics	  
 Two properties of the systems developed here combine to place powerful constraints on the 
inductive logics. 
 First, the inductive logic is deductively definable. It follows directly from the above 
general implicit and explicit definitions that, if two sets of propositions agree in their deductive 
relations, then they must agree in their inductive relations. That is, assume that a set of 
proposition are A, B, C, … and can be mapped to the second set A’, B’, C’, … in a way that 
preserves deductive structure. It follows that the inductive strengths formed from A, B, C, … 
must agree with the corresponding strengths formed from A’, B’, C’, … 
 Second, the deductive structure is highly symmetric. This means that the deductive 
structure preserving map can be implemented within a single algebra of propositions merely by 
relabeling the propositions. It then follows that many of the inductive strengths formed within 
the single algebra must be equal. 
An	  Illustration	  
 We can see how these equalities arise in the example of the art thief. Consider the support 
afforded by EC for each of BOS and NY. That is, compare [BOS|EC] and [NY|EC]. We shall see 
that they must be equal. 
 To see this, we relabel BOS and NY as: 
BOS’ = NY and NY’ = BOS 
The two remaining atom labels are unchanged other than for the addition of a prime: 
PHL’ = PHL and PIT’ = PIT. 
One sees immediately that the deductive structure of the propositions with the primed labels is 
the same as the deductive structure of the propositions with the unprimed labels. That is, for 
every deductive entailment in the first there is a corresponding deductive entailment in the 
second; and vice versa. For example, BOS deductively entails EC = BOS v NY v PHL. 
Correspondingly BOS’ deductively entails EC’ = BOS’ v NY’ v PHL’. 
 Since the inductive logic is deductively definable, it now follows that all corresponding 
inductive strengths must agree. That is we have: 
[BOS|EC] = [BOS’|EC’] 
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[NY|EC] = [NY’|EC’] 
[PHL|EC] = [PHL’|EC’] 
[PIT|EC] = [PIT’|EC’] 
etc, 
The primed propositions are merely relabelings of the unprimed propositions. In particular, BOS’ 
= NY and EC’ = EC. Making the replacements in the first equality [BOS|EC] = [BOS’|EC’] 
gives the result promised 
[BOS|EC] = [NY|EC]. 
 We can see informally how this equality comes about. It arises because the BOS-EC 
relationship is, roughly speaking, 
“single atomic proposition deductively entails three-atom disjunction.” 
The NY-EC relationship is the same. Since the deductive structures involved are the same, the 
correspondingly inductive strengths must be the same. 
The	  Symmetry	  Theorem	  
 The symmetry constraint can be generalized. Take a slightly more general case of a 
deductively definable logic in which the inductive strengths [A|B] are fixed by the deductive 
relations among A and B and the remaining propositions of the algebra. When might we have an 
equality of two strengths [A|B] and [C|D]? It arises when there is some relabeling possible for 
the atoms in the algebra, so that A and B are relabeled as A’ and B’ and 
A’&B’ = C&D 
A’&~B’ = C&~D 
~A’&B’ = ~C&D 
~A’&~B’ = ~C&~D 
This relabeling will be possible just in case the conjunctions to be set equal are formed from the 
same number of atoms. That is, the same number of atoms disjoined to form A&B and to form 
C&D; as so on for the remaining equalities, so that 
#A&B = #C&D 
#A&~B = #C&~D 
#~A&B = #~C&D 
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#~A&~B = #~C&~D 
where the notation “#proposition” indicates the number of atoms disjoined to form the 
proposition. 
 Then, by reasoning analogous to that of the last section, we can show that the deductive 
relations into which A and B enter are the same as those into which C and D enter. It now 
follows that the inductive strength [A|B] is fixed by the atom counts of these four conjunctions. 
That is: 
Symmetry Theorem 
For each deductively definable logic in which the inductive strengths 
[A|B] are fixed by the deductive relations among A and B and the 
remaining propositions of the algebra, there exists a function f such that 
[A|B] = f(#A&B, #A&~B, #~A&B, #~A&~B) 
We can illustrate this theorem in the case of the two logics considered above. For the 
probabilistic logic we have 
€ 
[A | B]P = P(A | B) =
# A& B
# A& B  +  # ~ A& B =
# A& B
# B  
For the specific conditioning logic, we have 
€ 
[A | B]SC =
(#A& B)2
(#A& B  +  # A& ~ B) ⋅ (# A& B  +  # ~ A& B) =
(#A& B)2
# A⋅# B  
In general, the specification of a new inductive logic merely requires the specification of a new 
function f in the theorem. 
 This formulation of the symmetry theorem is not the most general formulation. In general, 
the strengths [Ai|Ak] are fixed by deductive relations among the large set {A1, A2, … , Am} and 
their deductive relations with the other propositions in the larger algebra Ω in which it resides. 
The obvious generalization of the theorem is given in Norton (Manuscript, §4.2) 
How	  Might	  Deductive	  Definability	  Fail?	  
 The requirement of deductive definability is fragile and easily broken. Since that might not 
be immediately apparent, here is an example of a failure. Consider the deductively definable 
logic of induction specified by (4) and (5) above. Replace (5) by 
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For all atoms, a1, a2, …, an, 
m(a1) = m(a2)/2 = … = m(an)/n 
(5’) 
That is equivalent to setting the normalized measures of the atoms to 
m(a1) = 2/(n+n2),   m(a2) = 2.2/(n+n2),   m(a3) = 2.3/(n+n2),   …,   m(an) = 2.n/(n+n2) 
The corresponding conditional probabilities are  
P(a1|Ω) = 2/(n+n2),   P(a2|Ω) = 2.2/(n+n2),    
P(a3|Ω) = 2.3/(n+n2),  …,   P(an|Ω) = 2.n/(n+n2)                       (5’’) 
The key fact about these assignments is that they are non-uniform. That uniformity is 
unsustainable in a deductively definable logic of induction. Each of the atoms a1, a2, …, an 
enters into exactly the same deductive relations with the other propositions in the algebra. Hence 
deductive definability requires the equality of all these conditional probabilities 
P(a1|Ω) =  P(a2|Ω) =  P(a3|Ω) = …  = P(an|Ω). 
For the condition (5’) to be upheld, we must have some way of distinguishing among the atoms. 
Atom a1 will be assigned the smallest measure m; atom a2 will be assigned the next largest 
measure m; and so on. 
 Distinguishing among them cannot be done in terms of the deductive structure. It must be 
done by means external to the algebra. These means amount to external inductive content and 
lead to specification of the non-uniform probabilities (5’’). 
 Finally, since the logic is no longer deductively definable, it is no longer possible to define 
the conditional probabilities of (5’’) purely as a function of atoms counts, so the symmetry 
theorem does not apply to this logic. 
The	  Need	  for	  Disjunctive	  Refinements	  
 The example of the art thief shows how a simple deductively definable logic of induction 
can be inadequate for its intended purpose. We would like to know whether the evidence EC 
better supports that the art thief is in New York (NY), say, rather than in Boston, (BOS). 
However the logic requires [BOS|EC] = [NY|EC]. So differential support is not possible. 
 This problem will persist as long as the propositions form a small Boolean algebra based 
on just four atoms BOS, NY, PHL and PIT. The remedy is to increase the expressive power of 
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the algebra by increasing the number of atoms. For example, we may judge that there are a large 
number of possible lairs in Boston in which our thief may hide. If we write BOSi as the 
proposition that the thief is hiding in the ith of r possible lairs, then we create a disjunctive 
refinement of original algebra by replacing the atom BOS by the disjunction of new atoms 
BOS = BOS1 v … v BOSr 
Correspondingly we can expand the remaining atoms as 
NY = NY1 v … v NYs 
PHL = PHL1 v … v PHLt 
PIT = PIT1 v … v PITu 
The small four-atom algebra has now been replaced by a larger algebra with r+s+t+u atoms.  
 This larger algebra gives us a great deal more expressive power. We can assign widely 
varying support to propositions like BOS or NY, according to the values selected for r, s, t and u. 
In the probabilistic logic, we now have 
P(BOS|EC) =  r/(r+s+t)      P(NY|EC) = s/(r+s+t) 
If there are many more likely places to hide in New York than in Boston, we would have r<s and 
P(BOS|EC) < P(NY|EC). For the specific conditioning logic, we now have 
[BOS|EC]SC = r/(r+s+t)  
 [(BOS v PIT)|EC]SC = r2/[(r+t)(r+s+t)] = r/(r+t) [BOS|EC]SC 
Then [(BOS v PIT)|EC]SC would be reduced in relation to [BOS|EC]SC according to how large t 
is in relation to r. 
Asymptotic	  Stability	  
 This last example illustrates a general property of deductively definable logics of 
induction. By disjunctively refining the atoms, we introduce new possibilities that alter the 
inductive strengths. Part of that content comes in the inductive relations among the new atoms 
and the original propositions. The part that will concern us here, however, involves just the 
relations among the old propositions. 
 Here is an example. We fix just three for examination: BOS, NY and EC and ask after the 
support BOS accrues from evidence EC and the support NY accrues from EC. As we refine and 
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add more atoms, the relative strengths of support [BOS|EC] and [NY|EC] will change. Initially, 
these changes reflect the incorporation of new information into the algebra of propositions. There 
may be, for example, many more lairs in New York in which the art thief can hide. 
 In this process, we are not altering the evidence proposition directly. We are asking the 
same question repeatedly: what is the support accrued to NY from the evidence EC? What 
changes is the background deductive and inductive structure in which the propositions NY and 
EC appears. Those changes should be reflected, to greater or lesser degree, in the strength 
[NY|EC]. 
 Eventually, we expect that the new information incorporated will have diminishing import 
inductively. If NY1 happens to be the proposition that the art thief is in a luxurious Fifth Avenue 
penthouse apartment in New York, then we might refine it further as 
NY1 = NY1-NE v NY1-NW v NY1-SE v NY1-SW 
where NY1-NE is the proposition that the art thief is, at this moment, in the North-East corner of 
penthouse; and so on for the remaining three quadrants NW, SE and SW. Presumably this 
refinement would lead at best to a small change in the inductive strength [NY|EC]. 
 Or perhaps not. Perhaps there is some evidential import in the location of the art thief in the 
penthouse that the inductive logic can discern. Then we might refine further to incorporate still 
more inductively relevant information. Through the refinements, we may add new sorts of 
propositions, perhaps concerning the history of the art thief’s behavior, the climate in New York 
and elsewhere, the public transport system in various cities, and so on. 
 The requirement of asymptotic stability is that, eventually, continuing refinement will 
produce diminishing returns, in the sense that the original strengths like [NY|EC] alter less and 
less. Once we are at this point, strengths involving these propositions stabilize. They many stop 
changing completely. Or they may approach their limiting values asymptotically. For example, if 
[NY|EC] has the limiting value [NY|EC]lim, then, once we are at this point of diminishing 
returns, the actual value of [NY|EC] will be close to [NY|EC]lim and the sole change introduced 
by further refinement is to bring [NY|EC] closer to the limiting value, [NY|EC]lim.5 
                                                
5 More precisely, when we require that [NY|EC] approaches the limiting value [NY|EC]lim 
asymptotically we just mean this. Pick any measure of closeness to [NY|EC]lim you like: within 
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 The idea behind asymptotic stability is just that there is a right choice for the strength of 
support [NY|EC] once all relevant background information is incorporated into the algebra; and 
that the inductive logic implemented is able to find it, at least asymptotically. 
 The alternative is to allow that the strength [NY|EC] never stabilizes. That would mean 
that, no matter how much additional information we incorporate into the algebra of propositions, 
the value of [NY|EC] would keep changing without ever settling down. An inductive logic that 
behaves this way is of no value to us, for it is unable to implement the idea that there is a definite 
strength of support that EC affords NY in the context of even the fullest specification of 
background facts. 
 This discussion so far has dealt with a special case of the art thief. The general case is no 
different. As indicated above, we concern ourselves with some fixed set of proposition {A1, A2, 
… , Am}, where that set is very large and may include all the propositions considered in science. 
The requirement of asymptotic stability is that sufficient disjunctive refinement of the atoms 
leads each of the pairwise strengths [Ai| Ak] to settle down asymptotically to its limiting value, 
from which still further refinement cannot remove it. The limiting value is the best representation 
of the inductive support Ak affords Ai. 
The	  Two	  Requirements	  Conflict	  
 Now the trouble starts. We require two things of our logic of induction, each well 
motivated. First, we require it to be deductively definable, as a consequence of our requirement 
that the logic be complete. Second, we require asymptotic stability, as a consequence of our 
requirement that the logic can eventually lead to stable inductive strengths under continued 
disjunctive refinements. 
 The two requirements conflict and visit disaster on the logic. That is, if the logic is 
deductively definable, then it must be so responsive to different disjunctive refinements that it 
never settles down to limiting inductive strengths. Asymptotic stability proves unsustainable. 
                                                
1%, within 0.1%, within 0.001%, etc. Then it is always possible to refine the algebra so that the 
actually value of [NY|EC] lies within those bounds and so that it remains there under all 
possible, subsequent refinements. 
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 The instability is easily recoverable in the example of the art thief. Imagine that the art 
thief has a confederate within the police headquarters who is intent on confounding the police’s 
efforts. The confederate can confound any inductive logic merely by artful selection of 
disjunctive refinements. 
 The ease of this confounding follows directly from the symmetry theorem: inductive 
strengths are fixed by the atom counts in the propositions. The confederate can then confound the 
logic merely by refinements that artfully manipulate the atom counts and drive the inductive 
support in any direction the malicious confederate desires. 
 For example, take the probabilistic case above. We have 
P(BOS|EC) =  r/(r+s+t)      P(NY|EC) = s/(r+s+t) 
We might start with values r = s = t = 10, as result of the first refinement. Then we would have 
P(BOS|EC) =  1/3      P(NY|EC) = 1/3 
The confederate might choose to lead the police towards Boston by merely refining BOS much 
more than NY and PHL. So we might refine further to r = 1000 and s = t = 10. Then evidential 
support swings strongly towards BOS since we have 
P(BOS|EC) =  1000/1020 = 0.9804      P(NY|EC) = 10/1020 = 0.0098 
But had the confederate chosen instead to refine NY, we could get exactly the reversed result, 
from r = t = 10 and s = 1000: 
P(BOS|EC) = 10/1020 = 0.0098        P(NY|EC) =  1000/1020 = 0.9804  
No matter how far advanced the disjunctive refinements may be, this possibility for confounding 
by further, malicious refinement will always be there. There can be no stabilization of the two 
probabilities. For, if ever the probabilities seem to stabilize, further malicious refinement can 
drive them away from what appeared to be their limiting values.  The logic has no protection 
from this malice. Nothing within it can distinguish a refinement that reflects proper inductive 
import from one that merely deceives. 
 One might imagine the following escape. The malicious refinements are blocked merely 
by halting the disjunctive refinements at a stage at which further refinements would only advance 
the deception. This escape would succeed, but its success would depend upon knowing when is 
the appropriate stage of refinement at which to halt. That fact is not recoverable within the 
propositions of the algebra. It must be supplied by external considerations. These external 
considerations would then be supplying important inductive content in violation of the 
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requirement of completeness of the inductive logic. That is, we escape instability by admitting 
incompleteness. 
 The example above is drawn from a probabilistic logic of induction. The same malicious 
deception can be visited upon any non-trivial logic of induction. The symmetry theorem tells us 
that the strengths in any deductively definable logic of induction are fixed by the atom counts. 
As long as the logic assigns different inductive strengths when the atom counts change, a 
malicious confederate will always be able to steer the weight of inductive support in any desired 
direction. 
Triviality	  of	  a	  Complete	  Logic	  of	  Induction	  
 The escape that preserves completeness is an unhappy one: if the logic of induction fails 
to adjust its strengths of inductive support when the atom counts change, then it is immune to 
deception by malicious disjunctive refinements. However a logic that is unresponsive to the atom 
counts, or merely unresponsive in its limiting behavior, is a trivial logic that assigns the same 
limiting inductive strength in all cases, no matter what the atoms counts in the propositions might 
be. 
 In short, deductive definability and asymptotic stability forces the inductive logic to be 
the trivial logic that assigns the same limiting value to all inductive strengths. The discussion 
here does not provide a proof of this result. It merely recounts an example to illustrate how the 
result comes about. The full demonstration of Norton (manuscript), its “no-go” result, requires a 
great deal more logical accountancy. But those details introduce no further matters of principle. 
The essential manipulations have already been illustrated in the example above.  
 There is a technical complication in the full demonstration. To get the simplest version of 
the no-go result, a third condition of continuity is needed. It merely requires that inductive 
strengths do not make discontinuous jumps in their dependence on atom counts, when the atom 
counts are large. Without it, one still has triviality forced on the inductive logics, but the triviality 
comes in the form of a unique limiting value for each inductive strength, according to the class of 
deductive structure to which they belong. The notion of class is defined in Norton (manuscript). 
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PART	  III.	  Taking	  Stock	  
Escapes	  
 The no-go result is developed in a precise setting: the deductive structure is given by 
propositional logic with finitely many propositions; and the inductive structure is given by 
inductive strengths that are represented by the binary quantity [A|B]. The temptation is to look 
for ways of escaping the result by altering the setting. The prospects of such an escape are poor.  
 As far the deductive structure is concerned, the logic employs just the Boolean operators, 
They reappear in most, more developed deductive logics. All these logics will then admit the 
disjunctive refinements that power the present analysis. More generally, the decisive property of 
the deductive structure is that it is highly symmetric. This symmetry can be replicated in richer 
logics. For example, if we have a simple predicate logic with monadic predicates only, P1(.), … , 
Pn(.), then the logic will be symmetric under permutation of the predicates. 
 Similarly, a richer inductive structure will also generate corresponding no-go results. For 
example, we may replace [A|B] by a tertiary quantity, “[A|B,C],” as suggested earlier. It could be 
interpreted as the strength of inductive support afforded proposition A by B with respect to 
background C. The discussion above would remain largely unchanged except in the details. If the 
inductive logic is deductively definable, the strength of support would still turn out to be a 
function solely of the atom counts in propositions A, B and C. As a result it would be subject to 
confounding by malicious disjunctive refinement, as before, and the logic would be forced to 
triviality. 
 More briefly stated, the no-go result developed here is likely to be replicable in almost 
any setting precisely because there is rather little in it. Deductive structures are, generally, highly 
symmetric; and asymptotic stability is hard to deny, for otherwise the inductive logic would fail 
to assign a stable limiting value for the strengths of inductive support. With these properties 
pervasive, a version of the incompleteness result is always nearby. 
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Subjective	  Bayesianism	  
 Because of the present popularity of subjective Bayesianism, it is worth indicating how it 
interacts with the no-go result. To begin, the fact that prior probabilities can be assigned 
arbitrarily, according to our personal whim, does break the symmetry essential to the no-go 
result. However it breaks it at great cost, for the conditional probabilities cease to be measures of 
inductive support. They have become, initially, pure statements of opinion and, after 
conditionalization on evidence, an amalgam of opinion and evidential warrant. 6 
 One might hope that the amalgam of opinion and warrant can be separated into its 
elements by a confirmation measure. It would be defined in terms of the subjective Bayesians’ 
probabilities and would extract just the evidential warrant from the amalgam. What the no-go 
result asserts, however, is that any such confirmation measure must be trivial, if it is to be 
complete. For such a measure would conform to the conditions that lead to the no-go result. 
The	  Recalcitrance	  of	  Problems	  of	  Induction	  Explained	  
 This analysis establishes that any non-trivial calculus of inductive inference is 
incomplete. In retrospect that fact is not so surprising. The literature on calculi of inductive 
inference has been beset with persistent problems. We can now see that their recalcitrance is 
explicable as an inevitable outcome of incompleteness. 
 The traditional failure is the notorious problem of the priors in Bayesian analysis. The 
hope has been that we can push our inductive investigations back far enough to a neutral starting 
point, prior to the inclusion of any relevant evidence. There we seek a prior probability 
distribution that is vacuous in the sense that it inductively favors no particular proposition over 
any others. Yet no such vacuous prior has been found. All prior probability distributions exert an 
influence on the subsequent analysis and can only be used responsibly if they reflect the presence 
of further evidence outside the calculation. 
                                                
6 The celebrated “washing out of the priors” theorems fall short of what is needed. There is a 
reverse, indelibility result. Loosely speaking, for any fixed likelihoods and any fixed posterior 
probability we may choose, there will always be some perversely chosen prior probability 
compatible with it. 
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 That is just what incompleteness predicts. For a vacuous prior would enable a calculus to 
be complete.  Moreover the incompleteness result predicts that this problem of the priors will 
reappear in some form in any non-trivial calculus, not just a probabilistic calculus. 
 Another recurring problem is that the unadulterated probability calculus is not elastic 
enough to accommodate all inductive inference problems. There have been many extensions 
proposed. We may suppose, for example, that a simple probability measure is insufficient and it 
is replaced by a set of measures; or by a structure that uses interval values; and so on. Or we may 
alter the calculus in fundamental ways, such as the violation of additivity in the Shafer-Dempster 
calculus. Whatever successes these expansions meet, they are always limited. Further problems 
arise and call for still more extensions. 
 If we reconceive these proposals for altered calculi as efforts to find the one, true and 
complete logic of inductive inference, then their limited success ceases to be an unexpected 
annoyance. It is merely the reflection of a necessity: there can be no non-trivial, complete logic 
of inductive inference. 
How	  should	  we	  think	  about	  inductive	  inference?	  
 We need not give up the idea of calculi of inductive inference. Rather we should give up 
the quest for a single, all-purpose calculus that will give us a complete treatment of inductive 
inference. In its place, we should conceive of inductive inference locally. In any domain of 
investigation, no matter how big or how small, we may seek a calculus to govern our inductive 
inferences. However, that calculus will never provide a complete account of the inductive 
relations in that domain. We will always need further inductive content to be supplied externally 
to the domain. No matter what our domain, there will always be an external background to which 
we must resort for inductive content. 
 This local reconception of inductive inference is essentially the one that I have developed 
as the material theory of induction. See Norton (2003) and later papers. In each domain, there 
will be relations of inductive support peculiar to it. They are not warranted by conformity with 
some universal calculus. They are warranted by the particular background facts prevailing in that 
domain. If those relations are regular enough to be described abstractly, we may identify a 
calculus for those inductive relations. However whether there is such a calculus and what its 
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rules are will depend on the background facts prevailing in that domain. We should expect the 
calculus to differ from domain to domain. There is no universal calculus of inductive inference. 
That is the final moral of incompleteness. 
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